by
Austin BayJuly 24, 2026
On Feb. 17 of this year, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) temporarily closed the Strait of Hormuz -- or at least claimed that it had denied non-Iranian ships the right to pass through the Strait.
That day, I wrote a column arguing the size and composition of the forces the U.S. had deployed in the Middle East and "the Pentagon's capacity to reinforce it within six days" meant the U.S. had a very potent and flexible combat force that could quickly seize an Iranian seaport.
The column described the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas as "the prime target" -- the key geographic area on the Strait. From Bandar, IRGC forces can monitor transiting ships and interdict and target them with a variety of weapons -- missiles, aircraft, sea mines, fast attack vessels and drones (air and sea).
Sure, Iranian nuclear weapons development and nuclear assembly facilities are the primary targets. The Trump administration made that clear in June 2025 when Operation Midnight Hammer struck and devastated Iran's nuclear facilities, with the Fordow complex at the top of the list.
Israeli clandestine operations, Obama administration money and political yammering, and Arab pleading failed to curtail Iran's nuclear ambitions. Midnight Hammer left it in radioactive ruins. Subsequent attacks may have set Iran's nuclear quest back two decades.
However, even if the regime's nuclear program is shattered, three strategic facts remain. The first involves people: Regime fanatics still want nuclear weapons. The second involves natural resources: Iran still has huge oil reserves. Given global demand, those reserves will eventually return to the market. The third involves geography. (SET ITAL)Perceived(END ITAL) fanatic Iranian domination of the Strait of Hormuz could eventually give even a remnant regime the economic means to revive a nuclear weapons program.
Perceived is the operative word -- one the regime definitely understands. Non-negotiable control of the strait dominates the remnant regime's propaganda offensives.
Why? The following is probably the world's most widely known maritime shipping statistic: Every day, 20% of the planet's daily oil supply passes through Hormuz aboard tankers. That makes Hormuz a global economic choke point.
It's an old game but one that has worked. Since the 1990s, the ayatollahs and the IRGC have ritually threatened to close the strait in order to spike crude prices and -- Tehran's bet -- gain leverage over its political opponents. The threats and violent bluster, supported by occasional attacks, have been the dictatorship's most potent international diplomatic and economic gambit.
Until now. The Trump administration has decided to demonstrate Iran controls very little in and around the strait. In the past three weeks, the U.S. has escalated attacks on military targets near the strait.
Since the 1980s, the Pentagon has had contingency plans for clearing the Strait of Hormuz. In most scenarios, Bandar is a pivotal objective.
On the U.S. domestic political front, the Trump administration confronts opposition to "boots on the ground" -- meaning soldiers and Marines seizing territory.
However, a large raid involving Army and Marine combat forces would demonstrate the Iranian regime's utter lack of control over Hormuz. Seizing Bandar, holding it for several days, shooting hours of video recording the destruction of all Iranian military and port facilities in the area, would be a military stroke that makes the geopolitical fact clear.
Perhaps it's in the works. Reportedly, the U.S. has launched attacks on bridges and ground logistics routes connecting Bandar to the rest of Iran. That looks a bit like an isolation operation -- using air and missile attacks to make it difficult to physically resupply a particular city or area.
Last week, Bandar got headline coverage when American naval drones (unmanned vessels) attacked port and ship repair facilities. Several news outlets featured imagery of U.S. Navy suicide drones destroying a pier.
Credit Ukraine with demonstrating sea drone capabilities. Ukraine has been using sea drones to attack Russian targets for over three years. In 2026, Ukraine has also made extensive use of ground drones (various types of robots) to attack Russian positions within Ukraine. The U.S. has been experimenting with ground drones.
Actually, a Bandar raid by ground forces provides an ideal test for supporting ground forces with robots -- bots on wheels, tread and metal legs. Boots and bots.